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Abstract: 
 
This paper deals with the proposed use of sovereign credit ratings in the “Basel Accord on 
Capital Adequacy” (Basel II) and considers its potential effect on emerging markets financ-
ing. It investigates in a first attempt the consequences of the planned revisions on the two cen-
tral aspects of international bank credit flows: the impact on capital costs and the volatility of 
credit supply across the risk spectrum of borrowers. The empirical findings cast doubt on the 
usefulness of credit ratings in determining commercial banks’ capital adequacy ratios since 
the standardized approach to credit risk would lead to more divergence rather than conver-
gence between investment-grade and speculative-grade borrowers. This conclusion is based 
on the lateness and cyclical determination of credit rating agencies’ sovereign risk assess-
ments and the continuing incentives for short-term rather than long-term interbank lending 
ingrained in the proposed Basel II framework. 
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I Introduction 
 
“The effect of the capital requirements could be to encourage banks to 
lend more in the good times and discourage them from lending in hard 
times. That in turn could mean that economic cycles are more severe: 
the peaks of the booms will be higher, because credit is easy, and the 
thorough of the busts lower, because no one can borrow.”
1 
 
The severe financial market turbulences that erupted directly after Russia’s sovereign default 
and its currency devaluation in mid-August 1998 have raised various questions about the 
adequacy of the existing lines of defense against systemic risk in international financial 
markets (see, for example, STIGLITZ (1999)). FRANKEL AND ROUBINI (2003) observe that the 
three lines of defense against systemic risk, i.e., market discipline, prudential supervision and 
regulation, and macro-prudential surveillance, had proved inadequate to forestall a build-up in 
emerging markets’ vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY  FUND 
(2001a) notices that market participants were flabbergasted by the sharp increase in 
institutional investors’ risk aversion which led to the rapid process of de-leveraging and 
portfolio rebalancing. Even in some of the deepest international capital markets, liquidity 
pressures appeared. 
In such a financial market environment there are two possibilities still available to 
stabilize international financial markets: either the reduction of existing distortions or the 
induction of borrowers and lenders to internalize these distortions. An example of this view is 
expressed by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan when he proposed the imposition of 
reserve requirements on foreign commercial bank loans as a possible means of enforcing 
market participants’ discipline on today’s global financial markets: “Alternatively, the issue 
of moral hazard in interbank markets could be addressed by charging banks for the existence 
of the sovereign guarantee, particularly in more vulnerable countries where that guarantee is 
more likely to be called upon and whose cost might deter some aberrant borrowing”.
2 
The revised “Basel Accord on Capital Adequacy” by the Bank for International 
Settlements’ (BIS) Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), published in January 
2001, has intensified general interest in the credit rating industry. Under the “standardized 
approach to credit risk” credit ratings would be regarded as fundamental determinants of the 
                                                 
1   This quotation is taken from a comment by the FINANCIAL TIMES (2001) on the Basel II proposal. 
2   Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan taken from his speech on May 7, 1998 before the 34th Annual 
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risk weights attached to bank exposures to governments and other borrowers. However, not 
all market participants are convinced that the risk assessments by the credit rating agencies 
are reliable enough to act as a basis for those regulatory capital requirements. Therefore, this 
paper considers the proposed use of sovereign credit ratings in the “Basel Accord on Capital 
Adequacy” (Basel II) and its potential effect on emerging markets financing. It investigates in 
a first attempt the consequences of the planned revisions on the two central aspects of 
international bank credit flows: the impact on capital costs and the volatility of credit supply 
across the risk spectrum of borrowers.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the general 
issue of why commercial banks need to be regulated, by reflecting on the arguments of 
systemic risk and moral hazard in international financial markets. In addition, the existing 
framework (Basel I) is presented and it will be analyzed why the current Accord of 1988 
failed. Section III explains the proposed first pillar of the standardized approach to credit risk: 
“minimum capital requirements”. Additionally, the reactions by the credit rating agencies 
faced with Basel II are examined and the major shortcomings of the proposed framework are 
presented. Section IV investigates the potential pro-cyclical role of sovereign credit ratings in 
international financial markets and analyzes the potential impact of the proposed revisions on 
commercial banks’ capital adequacy ratios on emerging market countries. Section V 
concludes and presents an outlook. 
 
II  Capital Regulation of Commercial Banks 
Traditionally, commercial banks take deposits that can be withdrawn unconditionally at a 
fixed value at a very short notice and lend these deposits over a long-term horizon to 
industrial companies. In ordinary times, only a small fraction of financial assets need to be 
held in liquid reserves to meet customers’ deposit withdrawals. However, as it is shown, for 
example, in the model by DIAMOND AND RAJAN (2001), this frictional reserve holding can 
lead to illiquidity and even to the commercial bank’s bankruptcy when exceptionally high 
withdrawals take place and the long-term loans to industrial companies cannot be liquidated, 
even though the commercial bank might be fundamentally solvent in the long-term. 
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II.1  The Necessity for Commercial Banks to Be Regulated 
According to the BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (1999a), the primary function of 
liquid capital at a commercial bank is to serve as a buffer to absorb potential losses. 
Therefore, capital regulation seeks to ensure that this safety measure is large enough to 
preserve the soundness of individual banks and thus also the domestic and international 
banking systems.
3 In the case that liquid capital is insufficient to cover commercial bank’s 
unexpected losses, unsatisfied claims by depositors would ultimately lead to the bank’s 
insolvency. TREACY AND CAREY (2000) emphasize that the amount of capital that an 
individual bank upholds should be determined, among other factors, by the probability that 
losses of specific magnitudes will be experienced. In other words, the greater the probability 
of large losses, the greater should be the total of a commercial bank’s liquid capital in relation 
to its (short-term) liabilities. 
DE  BANDT AND HARTMANN (2000) point out that the health of a commercial bank 
depends not only on its success in selecting profitable investment projects for lending but also 
on the confidence of its depositors in the value of its loan book and, most importantly, in their 
faith that other savers will not “run the bank”. The authors mention that it is obvious that the 
more the commercial bank’s customers are sheltered through some deposit insurance system, 
the less probable it is that depositors’ confidence crises will emerge. 
The effective prudential regulation and supervision of commercial banks is fun-
damental to the financial market stability and to an efficient functioning of any economy, 
since the banking system plays the central role in the payments system and in the mobilization 
and allocation of saving. The INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1998) notes in this context 
that the task of such financial market regulation and supervision is to ensure that commercial 
banks operate in a cautious way and that they hold sufficient liquid capital and reserves to 
defend against potential risks that occur in their business. Weaknesses in the banking system 
of a country can jeopardize financial market stability, both in that country and internationally. 
Therefore, capital adequacy requirements, which oblige commercial banks to set aside 
sufficiently finances to safeguard their depositors, are one of the fundamental instruments in 
achieving global financial market stability. 
The justification for any capital market regulation generally comes from a market 
failure such as information asymmetries among borrowers and lenders. However, GOODHART, 
                                                 
3   CAREY (2002) notes that differences in opinions exist about the proper definition of “banking soundness”, but 
nowadays most financial market regulators seem to view a low rate of commercial bank insolvencies as the 
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HARTMANN, LLEWELLYN, ROJAS-SUÁREZ AND WEISBROD (1998) notice that in the case of 
international banking there is still no conformity in whether commercial banks need to be 
regulated and, if so, which way their financial market behavior should be restricted.
4 This 
reflects to some extent the lack of consensus on the nature of the market failure that leaves 
unrestricted commercial banking not optimal.
5 Nonetheless, the authors observe that there are 
at least two justifications that are often offered for the case for regulating commercial banks: 
the risk of a systemic crisis in global financial markets and the incapability of depositors to 
monitor commercial banks, which alludes to the problem of moral hazard. 
 
II.1.1 Systemic  Risk 
As shown in the theoretical framework by DIAMOND AND DYBVIG (1983, 1986) commercial 
banks are vulnerable to depositors’ bank runs, because they need to operate with a balance 
sheet where the liquidation value of their financial assets is less than the value of liquid 
deposits in order to offer liquidity services to their customers. DE BANDT AND HARTMANN 
(2000) indicate that given that depositors’ expectations about the value of their deposits 
depend on the so-called “first come −  first served” rule, a bank run can arise without the 
publication of adverse information about the commercial bank’s financial health. In the case 
that bank customers attempt to withdraw their funds out of anxiety that other depositors will 
do so first, they can force an otherwise solid commercial bank into bankruptcy. 
SANTOS (2001) demonstrates that if there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy 
since financial institutions could lend to each other and if each commercial bank’s investment 
in short-term financial instruments is visible, then depositors would be entirely insured 
against the liquidity risk faced by their financial institutions. However, when there exists in 
the financial markets asymmetry of information about the commercial banks’ assets, the 
interbank market will not generally be able to supply depositors with full liquidity insurance 
against the possibility of the commercial bank’s bankruptcy. 
DE BANDT AND HARTMANN (2000) mention that information asymmetries about the 
institutions’ financial health cause commercial banks that are also vulnerable to suffer an 
additional source of bank runs. They argue that a bank run that is set off by depositors losing 
their nerves or by the release of information signifying meager performance by the 
                                                 
4   See also the discussion in MISHKIN (2001). 
5   See, for example, the contradictory explanations for the existence of such market failure by BENSTON AND 
KAUFMAN (1996) and DOWD (1996). - 5 - 
commercial bank will be damaging, because it forces the premature liquidation of financial 
assets, and thereby upsets the banks’ expected benefits. Even worse, it may generate 
contagious bank runs, which may ultimately terminate in a system failure and the breakdown 
of the whole financial system. 
 
II.1.2 Moral  Hazard 
Since the seminal work by ROTSCHILD AND STIGLITZ (1976) it is a well-known fact that by 
guaranteeing that the commercial banks’ depositors are not at risk to potential losses, the 
provider of this deposit insurance bears the whole risk of a potential market failure. SANTOS 
(2001) argues that this results in moral hazard, since it diminishes the depositors’ inducement 
to closely watch the commercial banks’ behavior and to persist on an interest payment 
corresponding with the risk of the bank’s potential bankruptcy. Moreover, he argues that 
when the insurance system charges the commercial bank only a flat rate premium, the bank 
does not internalize the full costs of risk and as a result has the motivation to undertake even 
more risky financial transactions.
6 This implies that unreasonably priced deposit insurance 
provides commercial banks with a motivation to boost their risk of bankruptcy which they can 
achieve by increasing the risk of their assets and/or their leverage. 
DELONG AND EICHENGREEN (2001) highlight that the South Korean financial market 
experience during December 1997 was a classical example of such a bailout problem. For 
every US dollar of official money that was pushed by the central bank authorities into the 
weakening South Korean banking system, the commercial banks could take one US dollar of 
their money out. The authors argue that this did not only emasculate endeavors to bring the 
liquidity crisis to an end, but it also generated unfavorable political consequences and 
reinforced market participants’ apprehension about moral hazard. However, EICHENGREEN 
AND MODY (2000) indicate that compelling the financial institutions to leave their funds in the 
crisis-ridden country would have been ineffective in these circumstances which were 
surrounded by collective action problems. They mention that, in such financial market 
                                                 
6   MERTON (1977) established the application of the arbitrage pricing method, originally developed for pricing 
options on ordinary stocks, to investigate the deposit insurance distortion on commercial banks’ incentives for 
risk-taking. He indicates that the deposit insurance can be considered as a put option on the value of the 
commercial banks’ assets with a striking price equivalent to the promised maturity value of its debt. In the 
case that the insurance premium is risk-insensitive, the commercial bank can increase the value of the put 
option by raising the risk of its assets and decreasing its capital-to-assets ratio. Additionally, MATUTES AND 
VIVES (2000) prove that the commercial bank’s appetite for risk is further increased with a growing 
competition in the banking sector. - 6 - 
conditions not only might various commercial banks decline to participate in concerted 
action, but also individual governments. 
This existing trade-off between ruling-out depositors’ bank runs at the expense of 
moral hazard has been one of the central justifications for the regulation of bank capital. The 
financial market experiences in the second half of the 1990s have further motivated 
suggestions to modify the design of the deposit insurance system and to establish 
corresponding rules intended to moderate moral hazard while preserving the protection of 
commercial banks’ depositors (see ROGOFF (1999)). According to the STEERING COMMITTEE 
ON  REGULATORY  CAPITAL (2000), the most common proposals concerning the financial 
market dilemma of moral hazard caused by deposit insurance were to charge commercial 
banks risk-related insurance premiums and to regulate their capital structure. 
 
II.2  The Existing Framework: Basel I 
The SHADOW  FINANCIAL  REGULATORY  COMMITTEE (2000) remarks that the attempts to 
inaugurate international banking standards commenced shortly after the 1974 financial market 
failure of the Bankhaus Herstatt, a German commercial bank whose unfulfilled foreign 
currency obligations to primarily US commercial banks triggered widespread critical 
dislocations in foreign exchange and interbank markets. In consequence, in 1975 the G-10 
countries plus Luxembourg and Switzerland formed the BCBS, whose original task was to 
develop principles for the supervision of internationally practicing commercial banks.
7 
SANTOS  (2001) points out that in the 1980s numerous international banks suffered 
under the burden of non-performing loans to emerging market economies. These experiences 
during the Latin American Debt-Crisis provoked financial supervisors in the BCBS member 
countries to become more and more alarmed that a further weakening in liquid bank capital 
might endanger the stability of the global financial system. They were anxious that the 
bankruptcy of one or more of those financial institutions in emerging market economies might 
adversely distress the financial health of other countries’ commercial banks, since major 
international banks operated worldwide and were linked through payment systems and 
interbank deposits (see WHITE (2002a)). 
                                                 
7  The BCBS is a committee of banking supervisory authorities which consists of senior representatives of 
commercial bank supervisory authorities and central banks from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the US. The BCBS 
usually gets together at the BIS in Basel, Switzerland, where its permanent secretary’s office is located. - 7 - 
GOLDSTEIN (1997) mentions that as US bank regulators acted to refine the global 
banking system and considered tightening bank capital standards in the 1980s, there was 
growing apprehension that unilateral increases in capital requirements might leave US 
commercial banks at a competitive disadvantage relative to financial institutions in other 
industrial countries that were subject to more laissez-faire capital rules. In particular, concerns 
were raised on Japanese commercial banks’ behavior, since they had grown very rapidly in 
the 1980s and were beginning to achieve major advances in the US banking market (see 
SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITTEE (2000)). US bank regulators were afraid that 
unless some effort was made to harmonize capital standards around the globe, individual 
countries might relax their standards in a way of improving the competitive positions of their 
commercial banks. 
While all BCBS member countries regulated the capital of their own commercial banks 
during the 1980s, each country followed a different approach. Therefore, the BCBS began to 
seek out ways to promote international convergence of capital adequacy measurement and 
standards. Santos (2001) points out that the BCBS tried to accomplish primary goals such as 
eliminating inducements for excessive risk-taking by commercial banks in their loan and 
securities portfolios, broadening capital requirements to off-balance-sheet positions and 
eradicating discrepancies in the definition of capital as a source of competitive imbalance in 
international banking among the member countries. The BCBS considered that these 
ambitions could best be achieved by implementing minimum capital requirements for 
internationally practicing commercial banks. 
 
II.2.1  The Resulting Compromise 
The resulting framework, Basel I, on which a concord was reached in July 1988 and which 
was established in January 1993, takes into account merely the credit risk of commercial 
banks.
8 The BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (1988) argues that this construction 
should penalize commercial banks for taking on excessive credit risk, as it has been 
experienced during the “savings and loans crisis” in the 1980s, when troubled international 
financial institutions intensified their risk-taking in the hope of returning to solvency. The 
Basel I framework compels internationally practicing financial institutions to retain an eight 
percent minimum capital which is measured in different ways according to the credit risk of 
the respective financial instruments. The definition of capital is expressed broadly in two 
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tiers, with Tier 1 concerning the banks’ shareholders equity and retained earnings and Tier 2 
dealing with the available additional internal and external resources. 
The BCBS specified a risk-weighting framework to attach commercial banks’ capital 
requirements to the perceived credit risks of assets and off-balance-sheet obligations. A 
portfolio approach have been adopted to measuring credit risk, with assets classified into four 
“buckets”, namely zero, 20, 50, and 100 percent. Government bonds of OECD member 
countries were given a zero risk weight, while claims on other commercial banks were 
assigned a 20 percent risk weight, which translates into a capital charge of 1.6 percent. 
However, practically all claims on the non-bank private sector received the standard eight 
percent capital requirements. This implies that all corporate obligors were assigned, 
notwithstanding their domicile or their credit quality the same risk weight of 100 percent. 
Santos (2001) mentions that the two salient objectives of Basel I were to guarantee an 
adequate level of liquid capital in the international banking system and to establish a “more 
level playing field” in competitive terms so that commercial banks could no longer “build 
business volume” without an adequate capital backing. Further, the BCBS supervisors 
deemed that all jurisdictions represented in the Basel Committee would need to implement the 
new capital standards concurrently in order to abolish potential regulatory arbitrage. These 
three purposes were realized when the G-10 countries signed the accord in July 1988. 
Although Basel I was intended originally for internationally practicing commercial banks of 
the BCBS member countries, the framework has been considered applicable to various 
financial institutions worldwide. During the 1990s well over 100 industrial and emerging 
market countries adopted these capital adequacy rules. Additionally, since Basel I was 
implemented, five emerging market economies have joined the OECD, thus benefiting from 
lower risk weights on government debt from 100 percent to zero percent, and for their 
commercial banks from 100 percent to 20 percent with a lingering lending maturity of over 
one year. 
 
II.2.2  Refinements to Basel I 
Over time, Basel I has been fine-tuned to take into account financial innovations and some of 
the financial risks that were not well thought-out at the outset, while most of these changes 
were related to the handling of commercial banks’ off-balance-sheet activities. For example, 
in April 1993 the BCBS initiated an effort to enhance the initial capital requirement standards 
by recommending commercial banks to keep capital against market risks in their trading - 9 - 
book, and against potential losses that might stem from adverse changes in asset prices. 
Several major commercial banks, however, considered this proposal as too primitive and far 
too different from their internal market risk models (see SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
COMMITTEE (2000)). 
The BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL  SETTLEMENTS (1999a) points out that instead of 
insisting on a “one-size-fits-all” approach, the BCBS suggested that the amount of capital 
needed for market risk requirements should be based solely on the commercial banks’ internal 
models. This approach was implemented with the 1996 “Amendment to the Capital Accord”, 
which allows commercial banks the utilization of their own internal market risk models, 
provided that these models act in accordance with several qualitative and quantitative criteria 
such as successful backtesting. Furthermore, the 1997 “Core Principles for Surveillance of 
Banking and Financial Systems” established five categories of standards for sound 
supervision and successful regulation. These principles were negotiated by the BCBS in 
collaboration with financial market authorities from emerging market economies and were 
approved by the BCBS member countries in mid-1997.
9 
 
II.3  Failure of Basel I 
The SHADOW  FINANCIAL  REGULATORY  COMMITTEE (2000) argues that the 1988 capital 
adequacy framework has made an invaluable contribution to the substance of international 
commercial bank capital regulation. Basel I has been honored by many market participants as 
supporting the international convergence of capital standards. Nevertheless, RISK (1999), for 
example, observes that notwithstanding these advantages, Basel I was criticized for its failure 
to encompass major comprehensions of the theory of finance such as VaR modeling. 
These conceptual limitations went in conjunction with financial innovations that 
created opportunities for regulatory capital arbitrage, which led consequently to a weakening 
of the Basel I framework effectiveness. Additionally, the financial market experiences in the 
latter half of the 1990s have shown that the indicative power of the Basel I capital adequacy 
ratios for emerging market economies was by and large misleading. For example, ESTRELLA, 
PARK AND PERISTIANI (2000) reason that mainly as a consequence of inadequate loan-loss 
provisions, numerous commercial banks in these financial crisis-ridden emerging market 
                                                 
9   See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (1999a) for a detailed discussion of the “Amendment to the 
Capital Accord” and also for an overview of the “Core Principles for Surveillance of Banking and Financial 
Systems”. - 10 - 
economies reported affluent capital adequacy ratios just before the outbreak of their financial 
market turbulences. 
 
II.3.1  Capital Adequacy Ratios 
The simplicity, comparability, and verifiability of the Basel I capital adequacy ratios might 
have given market participants an incorrect impression of financial market protection, 
particularly as the capitalization of the majority of worldwide banking systems exceeded the 
eight percent minimum. Therefore, an emerging market’s commercial bank with a nominally 
high liquid capital ratio of 12 percent would be generally considered as well-capitalized. 
Nevertheless, such a 12 percent capital ratio may still be insufficient in the commercial bank’s 
operating environment and for its risk profile, which instead may call for a capital ratio of 
almost 20 percent in the economic sense. Indeed, KARACADAG AND TAYLOR (2000) mention 
that prior to the Asian crisis of 1997-98, many of the emerging market economies’ banking 
systems were believed as well-capitalized on the basis of their capital adequacy ratios, which 
evidently distorted the solvency of their commercial banks to manage the arising economic 
stress. 
The risk-weighting framework of only four risk buckets has been accused by both 
academics and practitioners of being too rudimentary, concerning the potential threat of a 
borrower’s default. Furthermore, the capital ratio minimum of eight percent has been 
disapproved of by many financial market observers as being purely arbitrary. For example, 
ALTMAN, BHARATH AND SAUNDERS (2002) make the case that the commercial banks’ capital 
requirements were by some means linked but not correlated closely enough to economic risk. 
They argue that the capital requirements are homogenous within each of these four risk 
buckets but the economic risk may be substantially different, which ultimately leads to an 
underlying construction of “perverse lending incentives”. 
CAREY (2002) emphasizes in this context that regulatory capital requirements that are 
not sufficiently sensitive to existing financial market risks cannot endorse international 
banking system soundness in the long-term as such obligations encourage commercial banks 
to discard low-risk assets while holding high-risk assets. Moreover, the author points out that 
if the regulatory capital requirement for a financial instrument is well above its economic 
capital requirement, an unregulated financial bank institution will find this asset much more 
lucrative than a commercial bank since it can be financed more inexpensively. This implies 
that, in the long-term, the majority of low-risk assets will disappear from commercial banks’ - 11 - 
balance sheets and only the relatively riskier assets for, which the regulatory capital 
requirement is equal to or below the economic capital requirement, will remain in the banks’ 
portfolio. 
As a consequence, commercial banks do engage in substantial arbitrage among loans 
whose market risks are significantly higher than the credit risk weights assigned by the Basel 
I framework. Moreover, as ALTMAN, BHARATH AND SAUNDERS (2002) indicate, these troubles 
are further exacerbated by the fact that the capital requirements for different financial 
instruments are determined by the book-value instead of market prices. Additionally, 
accounting practices differ considerably among the BCBS member countries and repeatedly 
generate results that deviate strikingly from financial market assessments. Furthermore, JONES 
(2000) demonstrates that the Basel I risk measurement framework does not offer a capital 
advantage for commercial banks with well-diversified portfolios, even though standard 
finance theory indicates that these portfolios should be considered less risky than concentrated 
portfolios. 
 
II.3.2 OECD  Membership 
RISK (2001a) observes that the Basel I capital requirement standards have also been 
denounced for failing to assign accurate risk weights and to support the safety of the banking 
system, because they do not take into consideration market risks, liquidity risks and 
operational risks which are all principal sources of commercial banks’ insolvency. Although 
the capital adequacy risk weights make the attempt to reflect credit risk, they are not based on 
financial market assessments but instead favor claims on financial institutions headquartered 
in OECD member countries. 
Without a doubt, this distinction plays a central role to make membership of the OECD 
a superseding goal of some middle-income emerging market economies by encouraging them 
to implement the economic, political and financial reforms considered necessary for OECD 
membership in an improvident fashion (see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (1999)). An 
often cited example in the literature is South Korea, which removed many capital market 
controls in the mid-1990s to match OECD entry requirements. The weaknesses of this OECD 
membership distinction approach are also illustrated by the fact that Mexico endured in a 
major financial market crisis shortly after it became a member of the OECD. - 12 - 
It is widely agreed among market participants that cross-border lending has confronted 
regulatory distortions through the Basel I framework. For instance, short-term bank lending to 
emerging market economies has been promoted by a fairly low 20 percent risk weight, while 
commercial bank lending to non-OECD commercial banks with a residual maturity of over 
twelve months has been discouraged by a 100 percent risk weight. This in turn has 
encouraged short-term cross-border interbank lending, which has been regarded in the 
literature on the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 as a major shortcoming of the international 
financial system. 
REISEN (2000) argues that these significantly lower risk weights encouraged numerous 
major internationally practicing financial institutions to provide too many short-term loans to 
Southeast Asian commercial banks. The domestic banks re-loaned these additional finances in 
domestic currency at substantially higher interest rates and took upon themselves an 
enormous foreign exchange rate risk. Standard finance theory indicates that such financial 
market distortions would be most detrimental for commercial banks that are capital-
constrained. Therefore, it is not surprising that Japanese commercial banks, which had been 
weakly capitalized throughout the 1990s, had amassed the largest concentrations of claims on 
wobbly Southeast Asian crisis-ridden commercial banks. 
 
II.3.3  Modern Risk Management Practices 
THE ECONOMIST (2001) mentions that Basel I has also come under intense pressure because 
financial market innovations which in some cases had the intention of circumventing the 
capital adequacy requirements, have eroded its effectiveness. These days, international 
financial markets are driven by worldwide practicing financial institutions that rely on modern 
financial techniques and instruments. Recent risk management practices, such as marking to 
market, margin calls, dynamic hedging and frequent portfolio rebalancing are causing 
immediate reassessments of financial market risk in response to new information. 
For instance, the mounting utilization of OTC derivatives and structured notes 
increases the capability of financial institutions to leverage their capital positions. These high 
levels of leverage may result in financial market systems that are capable of generating 
expensive blunders throughout periods of investors’ sentiment excitement by intensifying the 
boom-phase. On the other hand, such activities can also enlarge the adverse consequences of 
negative financial market distress and/or a wide-ranging reassessment of credit risk. 
Additionally, the WORKING GROUP ON CAPITAL ADEQUACY (2001) emphasizes that with the - 13 - 
same large worldwide practicing financial institutions operating in numerous different 
markets and countries, modern risk management practices are also creating the potential for 
spillovers between seemingly unrelated financial markets. 
 
III  Basel II: The Standardized Approach to Credit Risk 
Following the financial market turbulences in the latter half of the 1990s, in June 1999 the 
BCBS released a consultative paper concerning the suggestion for replacing the Basel I 
framework. The proposal recommended a new capital adequacy framework built on three 
pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and the effective use of market 
discipline through enhanced transparency (see BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL  SETTLEMENTS 
(1999b)). In January 2001, the BCBS issued a revised version of its reform proposal for the 
new capital adequacy framework but as RISK (2001b) remarks it will probably not come into 
force before the year 2004. 
Under the Basel II framework, the commercial banks’ minimum capital requirements 
will be assessed according to their exposure to credit risk, market risk and operational risk. 
Within this context, the BCBS has proposed two different methods to fine-tune the 
commercial banks’ capital charges to better reflect financial risk diversities among individual 
credit exposures: a standardized and an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to credit risk. 
The standardized approach to credit risk is based on externally provided risk assessments such 
as the rating assignments by credit rating agencies, while the IRB approach relies on 
commercial banks’ internal risk assessments. 
The BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2001b) recognizes that the reliability of 
credit rating agencies is crucial for the standardized approach to be effectual and argues, thus, 
that financial market regulators must certify these external credit assessment institutions 
(ECAIs). As a consequence, the following minimum criteria are proposed in selecting 
financial institutions eligible of generating credit risk ratings for utilization in the new Basel II 
risk weighting scheme: objectivity, independence, transparency, credibility, international 
access, resources and recognition. Table 1 presents a detailed description of these minimum 
criteria. - 14 - 
Table 1:   Criteria for Eligible External Credit Assessments Institutions 
Objectivity  The methodology for assigning credit assessments must be rig-
orous, systematic, continuous, and subject to some form of vali-
dation based on historical experience. Moreover, assessments 
must be subject to ongoing review and responsive to changes in 
financial condition. Before being recognized by supervisors, the 
Committee proposes that an assessment methodology for each 
market segment, including rigorous backtesting, must have 
been established for at least one year, while recognizing that a 
three-year period would be preferable. 
Independence  The methodology should be as free as possible from any exter-
nal political influence or constraints, or economic pressure from 
assessed entities. 
Transparency  For validation purposes, the individual assessments should be 
publicly available. 
Credibility  To some extent, credibility will be derived from the criteria 
above. This criterion should not be used as a barrier to the entry 
of new institutions, but, at the same time, any new institution 
that emerges following this change in the supervisory frame-
work would need to be carefully evaluated. The credibility of 
an institution would also be underpinned by the existence of in-
ternal procedures to prevent the misuse of confidential infor-
mation. 
International Access  The institution is not required to assess firms in more than one 
country, but its results should be available to non-domestic par-
ties with legitimate interest on the same basis as to equivalent 
domestic parties. 
Resources  The institution should have sufficient resources to allow sub-
stantial ongoing contact with senior and operational levels of 
assessed entities. 
Recognition  National supervisory authorities will be responsible for recogni-
tion of institutions based on the above criteria. It is proposed 
that the Secretariat to the Committee will serve as a clearing 
house of information on the institutions recognized by national 
supervisory authorities. 
Source: BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2001b) 
The following analysis concentrates on the major element of the proposed standardized 
approach to credit risk: minimum capital requirements. The focus lies on the suggested capital 
adequacy ratios since the risk weights applied to commercial bank assets and other financial 
instruments are of primary consequence for commercial banks’ credit and bond pricing.
10 
                                                 
10  See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2001b) for a discussion of the two other pillars. A detailed 
description of the IRB approach is given in BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL  SETTLEMENTS (2001a). See, for - 15 - 
 
III.1 Minimum  Capital  Requirements 
The BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2001b) argues that to enhance risk sensitivity 
without making the standardized approach too complex, the BCBS suggests that commercial 
banks should be obliged to apply predetermined risk weights for various types of financial 
instruments based on external risk assessments, such as credit risk ratings by S&P and 
Moody’s. HAWKINS AND TURNER (2001) emphasize that Basel II is designed to bring capital 
requirements more closely into line with a commercial bank’s risk profile and to take into 
account financial innovations, while maintaining in general the eight percent risk-weighted 
capital requirement in the financial market system. 
In contrast to the June 1999 proposal which suggested that the proposed risk weights 
for claims on governments, commercial banks and corporates, have to be benchmarked 
against the sovereign long-term foreign currency obligations by ECAIs, Basel II abandons 
this sovereign ceiling. Moreover, the BCBS no longer recommends the fulfillment of the 
IMF’s SDDS and the BCBS’s “Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision” as 
preconditions for favored capital adequacy risk weights. 
The proposed standardized approach markedly modifies the extent of different capital 
requirements used to classify borrowers’ credit risk. In particular, the current system of a zero 
risk weight for members of the OECD and 100 percent risk weight for all other countries is 
replaced by five new buckets based on the credit rating agencies’ risk assessments. In the case 
of by the agencies’ unrated entities, Basel II proposes to assign a risk weight of 100 percent 
leading to a capital adequacy ratio of eight percent. Table  2 portrays the suggested risk 
weights for commercial banks’ claims on sovereign borrowers, commercial banks and 
corporates. 
                                                                                                                                                          
example, CAREY (2001) for a comprehensive analysis of the potential implications of the IRB approach on 
financial markets. - 16 - 
Table 2:   The Proposed New Capital Adequacy Risk Weights  
  Assessment 
Borrower  AAA to AA−   A+ to A−   BBB+ to BBB−   BB+ to B−  <  B−   Unrated
Sovereigns 0% 20% 50% 100%  150%  100% 
Banks (1)  20%  50%  100%  100%  150%  100% 
Banks (2)  20%  50%  50%  100%  150%  50% 
Banks (2-S)  20%  20%  20%  50%  150%  20% 
Corporates 20%  50% 100% 150%  100%  100% 
Source: BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2001b) 
Table  2 illustrates that the highest rated sovereigns ranging from triple-A to AA−  
achieve a zero percent risk weight and governments that are assessed by the credit rating 
agencies as lower than B−  obtain a 150 percent risk weight, while unrated sovereign 
borrowers would be assigned a flat 100 percent risk weight regardless of their credit quality. 
This implies that in contrast to Basel I that encompassed a maximum capital requirement of 
eight percent, under Basel II, capital requirements could be as high as 12 percent for an 
emerging market economy with a weak sovereign credit rating. 
Within the proposed standardized approach to credit risk, the BCBS recommends two 
options to measure risk weights on lending to commercial banks. Table 2 indicates that, under 
the first scheme, claims on commercial banks would be given risk weights based on their 
respective government‘s credit rating. In this case, the risk weight applied to the commercial 
bank would be one category less favorable than the sovereign credit rating, while a ceiling of 
100 percent would be imposed, except for commercial banks in emerging market economies 
rated below B− , where a restriction of 150 percent would operate. Under the second option, 
claims on commercial banks would be designated the risk weights as given in Table 2, based 
on the credit ratings assigned directly to commercial banks by an ECAI. 
Table 2 demonstrates that the proposed Basel II framework also differs from Basel I in 
its treatment of short-term claims on commercial banks (2-S). Furthermore, the BCBS made 
the decision to lower the threshold for the favored treatment of short-term debt to three 
months since the upper maturity bound in the short-term interbank market is also three 
months. - 17 - 
Under Basel II, corporate borrowers rated by the credit rating agencies between triple-
A and AA−  would get assigned a risk weight of 20 percent which results in a capital adequacy 
ratio of 1.6 percent, which is much lower for high-quality loans than under the current capital 
requirements since under Basel I the risk weights are as high as 100 percent for all corporates 
regardless of their creditworthiness. Nonetheless, corporates assessed by the credit rating 
agencies as below BB−  obtain a risk weight of 150 percent, implying a capital ratio of 12 
percent. 
With regard to the level of overall capital, the BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS 
(2001b) argues that the BCBS’s primary objective is to provide a more risk-sensitive capital 
requirement approach and on average neither increases nor decreases commercial banks’ 
regulatory capital. In particular, lending to high-rated sovereigns, commercial banks and 
corporates would benefit from the Basel II framework, regardless of their countries’ OECD 
membership. This implies that, thus, apparent inducements will exist towards the 
implementation of measures which are likely to enhance the borrower’s credit rating, rather 
than a simple overriding motivation towards gaining OECD membership. 
 
III.2  Shortcomings of the Standardized Approach 
Despite the appeal of the BCBS’s suggested utilization of external credit risk assessments, the 
Basel II proposal has been subject to manifold criticisms by both market participants and 
credit rating agencies themselves, ranging from fundamental challenges to technical 
disapprovals of the suggested standardized approach to credit risk. 
 
III.2.1 Reliance on External Credit Ratings 
Relying on external credit rating agencies to set regulatory risk weights effectively obliges 
commercial banks to subcontract their assessments of borrowers’ creditworthiness to other 
financial market institutions. However, the core competency of commercial banks has always 
been borrowers’ risk assessment and intermediation of credit risk in financial markets which 
experience asymmetric information. For instance, TREACY AND CAREY (2000) point out that 
as a result of their close relationships with customers, commercial banks typically possess 
more comprehensive information than external credit rating agencies. - 18 - 
SANTOS (2001) argues that the raison d'être of optimal profitability forces commercial 
banks to persistently improve their internal risk assessment models. Since the bank own 
financial health is at risk, its management is best positioned to evaluate the financial risk that 
an individual borrower represents on a stand-alone basis as well as in relation to the bank’s 
portfolio composition. Additionally, a growing reliance on credit rating agencies could sooner 
or later undermine the credit risk analysis expertise within the banking community, since 
portfolio managers and controllers could become increasingly habituated to relying on 
external risk assessments rather than on their own investigations. 
Furthermore, there is the market participants’ growing unease about how accurately 
agencies’ credit ratings reflect underlying financial risks. For instance, The SHADOW 
FINANCIAL  REGULATORY  COMMITTEE (2000) argues, that in the case of sovereign credit 
ratings, the ambition of the agencies seems to be to encapsulate default risk rather than 
unexpected loss. But such focus on potential governments’ default offers an important 
argument for questioning the employment of credit rating agencies’ risk assessments for 
capital adequacy requirements since defaults are exceptionally vulnerable to financial 
contagion. In contrast, the center of capital adequacy ratios should lay in covering commercial 
banks’ unexpected loss with a sufficient high probability, thereby safeguarding their 
soundness and limiting their likelihood of insolvency. 
The STEERING  COMMITTEE ON REGULATORY  CAPITAL (2000) criticizes that the 
regulatory dependence on credit rating agencies’ risk assessments entails the possibly flawed 
supposition that bond credit ratings generate suitable appraisals of broader financial market 
risks. Nonetheless, the distribution of losses in a commercial banks’ loan portfolio could be 
fundamentally different from that in a bond portfolio since default rates on publicly issued 
bonds may vary systematically from loan default rates.  
Additionally, the credit rating agencies’ coverage of obligors is far from being good 
enough to encourage their application in a global regulatory capital adequacy framework. For 
example, S&P and Moody’s have dedicated the majority of their efforts to more developed 
economies, where marginal and fixed expenses related to the coverage of issuers are lower 
and where the request for their credit risk assessments is higher. Furthermore, in the US credit 
ratings are prevalent, for example 94 percent of the S&P500 firms are assessed while in 
European financial markets credit ratings are not as widely spread: only 53 percent of all 
German DAX-30 firms have obtained a credit rating (see WHITE (2002b)). 
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III.2.2 “Rating Shopping” 
Another underlying shortcoming of the standardized approach to credit risk is that financial 
market regulators fundamentally change the nature of the credit rating agency’s product by 
using external ratings as a tool for determination of commercial banks’ capital requirements. 
Issuers would then pay rating fees, not to facilitate access to international capital markets, but 
to pay for a privileged treatment for their securities within the Basel II framework.  
The credit rating industry is subject to a sinister form of moral hazard since every 
agency has an inducement to assign issuers high-quality credit ratings, because issuers are 
free to decide on which agency they will select and pay for their risk assessments. PARTNOY 
(2002) emphasizes that this incentive towards upwardly biased risk assessments has generally 
been compensated by a credit rating agency’s superseding necessity to preserve its financial 
markets reputation with investors since they ultimately drive the issuer’s request for credit 
ratings. However, by certifying the risk assessments of all recognized credit rating agencies as 
being of similar quality, regulators will force credit rating agencies to compete on the basis of 
price and level of credit rating assigned. As a result, BCBS-licensed credit rating agencies 
will have a product to sell regardless of its quality and its credibility. GRIEP AND DE STEFANO 
(2001) argue that, thus, issuers could be attracted to engage in “rating shopping”, that is a 
process in which the issuer seeks the least costly or least demanding credit rating. 
CANTOR AND PACKER  (1997) show that secondary credit rating agencies have a 
consistent bias towards higher credit ratings when compared to the major credit rating 
agencies S&P and Moody’s. This observation is consistent with the intuitive impression that 
the credit rating agencies’ reputation and the incentive to assign higher credit ratings are 
inversely correlated. This implies that to the extent that a credit rating agency already has 
earned a reputation in financial markets, it is doubtful that the agency would trade-off its 
status for short-term benefits in market share and revenue. On the other hand, a credit rating 
agency with no reputation has less to lose by assigning non-justified superior risk assessments 
to increase market share, and therefore has a stronger motivation to do so. Furthermore, 
CALOMIRIS AND POWELL (2001) reason that because US credit rating agencies currently 
dominate the rating business, regulatory authorities in other countries would be enticed to 
approve new domestic credit rating agencies without necessarily fully taking into account the - 20 - 
quality of their risk assessments, thereby undermining the effectiveness of external credit 
ratings in the regulatory process.
11 
 
III.2.3 The Proposed New Risk Weights 
The SHADOW  FINANCIAL  REGULATORY  COMMITTEE (2001) emphasizes that the proposed 
capital adequacy risk weights do not match the characteristics of credit risk for high-quality 
borrowers which exhibit only modest increase in risk but then rises sharply as obligors’ credit 
quality weakens. In sharp contrast, the proposed Basel II risk weights increase in large steps 
but remain flat and static at just the point at which credit quality is worsening most rapidly. 
For example, ALTMAN, BHARATH AND SAUNDERS (2002) demonstrate in an empirical study 
that the proposed BB+ to B−  range contains substantial deviations in obligors’ credit quality. 
Assigning all borrowers in this range the same risk weight of 100 percent emasculates one 
fundamental objective of Basel II, which is, according to the BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS (2001b), “to encourage banks to increase granularity of their credit assessment 
systems”. If the aim of the proposed new capital adequacy framework is to improve the 
relationship between regulatory capital and credit risk, then the number of risk-weighting 
categories should be extended. 
Besides, ALTMAN, BHARATH AND SAUNDERS (2002) criticize that the proposed risk 
weight for commercial banks’ lending to corporates rated in the range between triple-A and 
double-A is at 20 percent, even though their empirical results indicate that corporates with 
such a high credit rating never defaulted over a one-year horizon between 1981 and 2000. 
Another major shortcoming of Basel II is that, as Table 2 shows, in the case of sovereigns and 
commercial banks, the risk bucket partition is selected between BBB+ to BB−  and below 
BB− , rather than a more intuitive splitting of commercial banks’ lending between investment-
grade and speculative-grade. 
A fairly apparent inconsistency of the proposed Basel II framework is the fact that it 
imposes a lower capital requirement on commercial banks’ loans to not rated obligors with 
eight percent than it does to borrowers assessed by the credit rating agencies as of below B−  
with 12 percent. While there may be particular circumstances in which this distinction is 
justified, it is doubtful whether it is, in general, reasonable. 
                                                 
11   For example, the Indian central bank’s response to the Basel I framework was that capital requirements 
should only be based on domestic credit rating agencies’ risk assessments since international agencies do not 
understand emerging market economies (see MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (2000)). - 21 - 
The SHADOW  FINANCIAL  REGULATORY  COMMITTEE (2000) indicates that most 
commercial banks benefit also from lending to developing small businesses that have the 
propensity of being not evaluated by the credit rating agencies. However, a regulatory capital 
framework that favors good quality rated borrowers over good quality unrated loans would 
harm the commercial banks’ ability to provide credit to unrated borrowers on competitive 
terms. This means that the implementation of Basel II might place commercial banks at 
disadvantage since good quality unrated borrowers might find it less expensive to obtain 
funding from other financial sources. 
Moreover, since unrated obligors experience a lower risk weight than obligors rated 
BB−  or below, Basel II creates the motivation for hazardous borrowers to forego credit ratings 
altogether in order to achieve inexpensive commercial bank loans. Such activities are even 
encouraged by the recent appearance of credit rating instruments such as Moody’s “Rating 
Assessment Service” which allows borrowers to obtain a confidential prediction of its credit 
rating without having to commit the public distribution of its risk assessment.
12 
It is not obvious why the proposed risk weights for equivalently rated issuers in differ-
ent markets differ to such a large extent. For example, Table 2 shows that a commercial 
banks’ credit to a single-A rated sovereign would obtain a 20 percent risk weighting, while 
loans to single-A assessed commercial banks and corporates would be charged with a 50 
percent risk weight. However, from an anticipated frequency of default perspective, these 
loans would be considered equivalent by the credit rating agencies. While the financial 
support for governments in times of financial market turbulences from the IMF, other 
multilateral institutions and/or central banks may affect the sovereign’s credit risk, GRIEP AND 
DE  STEFANO (2001) advise caution in building moral hazard into the proposed capital 
adequacy rules. For instance, in circumstances where it is less complicated for the sovereign 
to gain access to commercial bank financing than it is for likewise rated domestic banks, the 
government could be encouraged to borrow to strengthen those banks. However, this could 
have unfavorable consequences for the sovereign’s own credit rating and it would further 
raise the issue of moral hazard by questioning how the domestic banks are managed. 
 
                                                 
12  See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (2000) for a description of its “Rating Assessment Service”. - 22 - 
III.2.4 The Reaction by the Credit Rating Agencies 
The credit rating agencies have expressed concern that the utilization of their risk assessments 
for capital adequacy requirements has the propensity to undermine the objectivity of the 
rating process and may negatively influence the agencies’ independence. MOODY’S 
INVESTORS SERVICE (2000), for example, emphasizes that it is the agency’s task to make 
autonomous and sometimes controversial risk assessments regarding powerful and prominent 
issuers. However, agencies’ actions which directly affect the issuer’s borrowing costs are not 
appreciated by the issuers (see Kräussl (2003a)). Consequently, credit rating agencies are 
worried that an increasing application of their risk assessments to the regulatory process will 
ultimately lead to calls for official supervision and regulation of their business. CANTOR 
(2001) argues that such regulation would result in conformity and weaken the role of credit 
ratings as beneficial independent evaluations on financial market risk. 
MOODY’S  INVESTORS SERVICE (2000) makes the case that an increased reliance on 
credit rating agencies’ risk assessments would require that the recognition criteria must be set 
at an appropriately high standard. However, Table 1 indicates that the Basel II proposal makes 
no reference to a credit rating agency’s market acceptance, historical performance or scale 
equivalence. Nevertheless, the focus of any ECAI recognition process should be upon results 
and not upon the methodological inputs to the risk evaluations. GRIEP AND DE STEFANO 
(2001) point out that the issue of how well a credit rating agency distinguishes relative credit 
risk of different obligors can best be judged by the financial markets’ recognition of its credit 
ratings and the default and loss experience by rating level. 
While the ECAI recognition criteria request thorough back-testing of the risk as-
sessments before approving a credit rating agency, Basel II sets the minimum time for an 
ECAI to be in operation at only one year. KARACADAG AND TAYLOR (2000) reason that the 
BCBS appears reluctant to set a higher threshold from concern of building too high barriers to 
companies entering the credit rating industry. Nevertheless, as conferred in Kräussl (2003a), it 
is not feasible to evaluate a credit rating agency’s track record established over only one year 
since robust relationships between issuers’ risk assessments and defaults take a longer time to 
materialize. 
Despite those earlier concerns about the utilization of credit ratings in the regulatory 
process, the credit rating agencies have indicated that the standardized approach to credit risk 
would also have constructive implications for commercial banks’ financial health. For 
example, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (2001) argues that the proposed capital adequacy - 23 - 
ratios could result in lower loan-loss provisions to the extent that commercial banks intensify 
their focus on financial risk at the beginning of the loan contract rather than at a later stage. 
 
IV  Basel II and Its Effects on Emerging Markets Financing 
This section represents a first attempt to assess the potential implications of the standardized 
approach to credit risk proposed by the Basel II framework on the volatility and size of 
commercial banks’ lending to emerging market economies.
13 Hence, historical sovereign 
credit ratings for long-term foreign currency debt are employed to examine the probable effect 
of the introduction of a linkage between commercial banks’ capital adequacy ratios and 
external sovereign risk assessments assigned by the credit rating agencies to emerging market 
countries. 
 
IV.1  Aggravation of Financial Market Turbulences 
A well-designed regulatory capital adequacy system should lead to rising capital reserves 
during times of commercial banks’ high profitability, which typically coincides with periods 
of business expansions, and falling capital reserves during financial market downturns as 
unexpected losses are written-off against capital. In this context, ALTMAN AND SAUNDERS 
(2001) mention that commercial banks find it more challenging, if not impossible, to increase 
their capital reserves substantially when the economy is in recession and commercial banks’ 
profits are dwindling. Additionally, as reasoned in Section II.1, capital reserves should be 
sufficient prior to and not after borrowers’ defaults and thus commercial banks’ unexpected 
losses. 
The FINANCIAL MARKETS GROUP (2001) points out that the financial risk of assets 
varies over the business cycle. However, if credit ratings are lagging financial markets, Basel 
II would generate a pro-cyclicality in capital requirements. Commercial banks would overlend 
and hold less liquid capital at the peak of the credit cycle, just when the menace of a systemic 
crisis is largest. On the contrary, commercial banks would underlend and hold too much 
capital reserves during an economy’s downturn when macroeconomic stabilization would 
                                                 
13  For an empirical investigation of the potential implications of the IRB approach on the international capital 
flows to emerging market economies see GRIFFITH-JONES AND SPRATT (2001), GRIFFITH-JONES, SPRATT AND 
SEGOVIANO (2002), SEGOVIANO AND LOWE (2002) and WEDER AND WEDOW (2002). - 24 - 
necessitates a credit expansion. As a result, capital adequacy requirements à la Basel II could 
ultimately translate into a higher probability of financial market crisis. 
The imperative concern that the implementation of the Basel II framework will raise 
the volatility of private capital flows to speculative-grade countries, and hence increase their 
vulnerability to financial crises, is based on two critical components incorporated in the 
proposed determination of commercial banks’ capital requirements: the pro-cyclical role of 
credit rating agencies’ risk assessments and the continuing attraction of short-term rather than 
long-term interbank lending. 
 
IV.1.1 Tendency of Lagging Financial Markets 
Numerous financial market observers are troubled that sovereign credit ratings would 
contribute a pro-cyclical element into commercial banks’ capital adequacy requirements 
under the Basel II framework. The major concern that derives from the empirical results in 
Kräussl (2003b) is that credit rating agencies tend to lag financial market developments by 
raising sovereign credit ratings throughout times of economic expansion and by lowering their 
risk assessments in periods of economic distress. As emphasized by REISEN AND VON 
MALTZAN (1999), this implies that during boom-periods sovereign credit ratings will improve 
while they decline during bust-periods, thereby contributing to boom-bust cycles in lending to 
emerging market economies. In addition, the empirical results indicate that sovereign credit 
rating changes have a powerful impact on financial market dynamics, both within national 
borders (see Kräussl (2003b)) and across borders (see Kräussl (2003c)). 
One major concern is that if a country is abruptly downgraded from investment-grade 
to speculative-grade in the midst of a financial crisis, then, as discussed in Kräussl (2003a), a 
number of institutional investors could be confronted with either higher capital charges or 
prohibition on continued holdings of the government’s securities in their portfolios. 
Furthermore, the resulting portfolio adjustments would limit the finances available to 
governments and impose higher borrowing costs. Such a credit rating adjustment may 
accurately indicate to market participants an increased issuer’s default risk and hence be a 
reasonable routine in the context of the traditional role of credit rating agencies, but this 
practice has an inherent disparaging consequence if integrated into commercial banks’ capital 
requirements. - 25 - 
The experience during the financial crises in emerging market economies in the latter 
half of the 1990s indicates that sovereign credit ratings can rapidly swing downward. Relying 
on external credit risk assessments to determine regulatory capital requirements could 
establish a sizeable liquidity squeeze in the course of financial market turmoil. A credit rating 
agency’s sovereign downgrading would oblige commercial banks to instantaneously enlarge 
their capital reserves against exposures to the lowered government, at a point where financial 
institutions should be supported to keep credit lines open to prevent accelerating financial 
market turbulences. Therefore, the exclusive reliance on credit rating agencies’ sovereign risk 
assessments would introduce systemic risk and result in an enhanced rather than reduced 
degree of instability in the global financial market system. However, this is precisely contrary 
to what financial economists suggest being the optimal approach for commercial banks’ 
regulatory capital requirements (see, for example, ALTMAN AND SAUNDERS (2001)). 
The evaluation of the credit rating agencies’ behavior in Kräussl (2003a) and the 
findings of the empirical studies in Kräussl (2003b, 2003c) seem to suggest that there is little 
scope to enrich the credit rating agencies’ performance in capturing sovereign risk. The nature 
of sovereign risk and the reduced public availability of sovereign default determinants make it 
tricky or even not feasible to obtain an information advantage over financial markets. 
Nevertheless, the proposed Basel II framework would serve to strengthen the financial market 
implications of credit ratings. However, as long as the credit rating agencies’ sovereign risk 
assessments fail to convey essential new information to financial markets, an improving 
sovereign credit rating would fortify market participants’ euphoric expectations and fuel 
excessive capital inflows to emerging market economies. 
 
IV.1.2 Short-Term Lending 
The BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2001b) emphasizes that the proposed Basel II 
capital requirement rules for commercial banks’ short-term lending are in direct response to 
the financial crises in the latter half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, imposing large capital charges 
on short-term lending to financial institutions in emerging market economies, where far-
reaching domestic financial market reforms are not undertaken, could strengthen 
disintermediation rather than promoting financial market stability (see SHADOW FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY  COMMITTEE (2000)). According to the WORKING  GROUP ON CAPITAL 
ADEQUACY (2000), the proposed modifications to the treatment of short-term interbank - 26 - 
lending would harm crucial interbank money market transactions in emerging market 
economies. 
Furthermore, the proposed Basel II capital adequacy ratios also discourage long-term 
interbank lending to emerging market economies. For example, commercial banks which 
suffer from their government’s credit rating of below investment-grade have the regulatory 
incentives for short-term interbank lending. However, a high ratio of short-term foreign debt 
to foreign exchange reserves has been identified by a number of empirical studies as the most 
crucial indicator of financial market crises due to capital flow reversals (see, for instance, 
REISEN (2001)). 
The encouragement towards short-term lending is less incorporated in Basel II than in 
Basel I, and is for that reason a move in a desirable direction, but unfortunately this incentive 
has not been entirely abolished. Table 2 underscores the fact that rationales for short-term 
lending remain for commercial banks assessed in the range between A+ and B− . The results 
of an empirical analysis by DEUTSCHE BANK (2001) point out that a jump in capital adequacy 
risk weights from 20 percent to 50 percent between double-A and single-A rated securities 
drastically overstates the increased probability of borrower’s default, thereby generating a 
bias against long-term lending to commercial banks rated below double-A. 
 
IV.2  Potential Implications of Basel II during the Financial Market 
Turbulences of 1997-99 
The experience with sovereign ratings in emerging market economies during the recent 
financial market turmoil may provide an illustration of how the adjustments of sovereign risk 
assessments could have had some harmful macroeconomic consequences if they had been 
linked to commercial banks’ capital adequacy requirements. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
the financial crises during the latter half of the 1990s induced credit rating agencies to a long 
sequence of sovereign risk assessment revisions. - 27 - 
Figure 1:   Emerging Market Sovereign Rating Changes by Moody’s 
(June 1997 and June 1999) 
Based on the sovereign ratings by Moody’s, Figure 1 reports on the  x-axis the pre-
crisis sovereign credit ratings as of June 1997 and on the  y -axis Moody’s post-crisis 
sovereign risk assessments in June 1999 for the 28 countries which are classified by The 
Economist and the Financial Times as emerging market economies as of June 1997, with the 
exception of Israel. Notably, the country sample contains 11 Asian economies (China, Hong 
Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand), eight Latin American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), five Eastern European (Transition) economies (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and the Slovak Republic), three African/Middle 
East economies (Egypt, Morocco and South Africa) and Turkey. 
The diagonal line of Figure  1 contrasts the pre-crisis with the relative post-crisis 
sovereign credit ratings, the vertical dotted line separates investment-grade from speculative-
grade sovereign risk assessments as of June 1997, and the horizontal dotted line divides 
investment-grade from speculative-grade sovereign credit ratings as of June 1999. This 
implies that points lying below the diagonal line identify those emerging market economies 
which suffered a lowering of their risk assessment by Moody’s, points lying on the diagonal 
line refer to those sovereigns whose credit rating did not change, and points above the 
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diagonal line show those emerging markets whose sovereign credit rating improved between 
June 1997 and July 1999. 
In addition, the horizontal and vertical dotted lines divide the graph into four quadrants. 
Points in the Northeast quadrant identify emerging market economies holding investment-
grade credit ratings in both mid-1997 and mid-1999, while points in the Southwest quadrant 
indicate governments assessed as speculative-grade in both mid-1997 and mid-1999. Points in 
the Southeast quadrant refer to sovereigns keeping investment-grade credit ratings in June 
1997 and switching to below investment-grade in June 1999, while points in the Northwest 
quadrant would have shown emerging market economies holding speculative-grade credit 
ratings in June 1997 and switching to investment-grade in June 1999. 
Figure  1 indicates that beside the sovereign credit rating downgrades of Brazil, 
Venezuela and that of Russia, the sharpest sovereign credit rating adjustments affected the 
Southeast Asian crisis countries. As discussed in Kräussl (2003a), Indonesia, South Korea and 
Thailand fell below investment-grade and Malaysia came close to this threshold.
14 
As illustrated in Table 2, under the proposed Basel II capital adequacy framework, the 
sovereign risk weighting could jump from 20 percent over 50 percent to 100 percent or even 
150 percent. This would have a major impact on commercial banks’ lending to emerging 
market economies. ALTMAN AND SAUNDERS (2001) criticize that, for example, a confirmed 
letter of credit to borrowers in emerging market economies facing financial turbulences would 
require abruptly increased capital charges which would have direct implications on the costs 
of credit and the country’s access to international capital markets. The empirical results of the 
study by DEUTSCHE BANK (2001) indicate that the probable commercial bank response would 
be to curtail lending to lower rated borrowers, thereby raising the vulnerability of the whole 
financial system to a liquidity crisis.  
Even worse, if the new proposed Basel II risk weights had been in effect in mid-1997, 
they would not necessarily have required commercial banks to hold more liquid capital for 
lending to emerging market economies on account of their favorable agencies’ sovereign 
credit rating and would have only increased the capital charges after the financial crisis 
erupted. For example, in the case of South Korea, under Basel I the capital adequacy risk 
weight was zero before its financial crisis and would have been the same risk weight under 
the Basel II proposal, because of the high investment-grade credit rating assigned to the 
                                                 
14  Figure 1 indicates South Korea as an investment-grade credit, because the sovereign was upgraded from Ba1 
to Baa3 by Moody’s on February 22, 1999. - 29 - 
country by the major credit rating agencies. Nevertheless, as South Korea was downgraded by 
Moody’s repeatedly throughout the Asian crisis, the sovereign risk weight would have risen to 
100 percent by end-1997. 
Following the new risk weights proposed by the BCBS, Table 3 presents the impact of 
the Basel II framework on commercial banks’ capital adequacy requirements for lending to a 
number of selected emerging market economies based on S&P’s sovereign credit ratings 
during the period between June 1997 and June 1999. 
Table 3:   S&P’s Sovereign Rating Changes and Their Implications on the 
Proposed Capital Requirements (June 1997 to June 1999) 
Country  S&P’s Range  
of Ratings 
S&P’s Rating 
Actions 
Basel II Risk 
Weight Changes 
Argentina BB  to  BB  −   −  
Brazil  BB−  to B+  1 negative  1 negative 
Indonesia  BBB to SD  1 positive, 6 negative 2 negative 
South Korea  AA−  to B+  2 positive, 4 negative 1 positive, 3 negative
Malaysia  A+ to BB−   4 negative  −  
The Philippines  BB+ to BB+  −   −  
Russia  BB−  to SD  5 negative  1 negative 
Thailand  A to BB−   3 negative  1 negative 
Pakistan  B+ to SD  1 positive, 4 negative 1 negative 
Slovak Rep.  BBB−  to BB+  1 negative  1 negative 
 
Table 3 suggests that there seems to be little correlation between the number of S&P’s 
sovereign rating actions and the number of changes in risk weights. For example, South 
Korea, with six rating actions between June 1997 and June 1999, would have had four 
changes of risk weights while Malaysia, with four sovereign rating changes during the same 
period, would have experienced no adjustments in its respective Basel II risk weight. The 
implications of S&P’s sovereign rating actions on the proposed commercial banks’ capital 
requirements are shown graphically in Figure 2 for the selected emerging market economies 
from Table 3. - 30 - 
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Figure 2:   S&P’s Sovereign  Rating Changes and Their Implications on the Proposed 
Capital Requirements (June 1997 to June 1999) 
Figure 2 illustrates that the proposed risk weights can also change very rapidly. For 
example, South Korea went from the lowest risk weight at zero percent in October 1997 to 
100 percent in just about two months in late December 1997.  - 31 - 
The suggested removal of the distinction between OECD and non-OECD member 
countries is likely to have damaging consequences for OECD emerging market economies 
which are low-rated by the credit rating agencies. As Table 2 demonstrates, OECD member 
countries currently assessed below AA−  would have most to lose under the proposed Basel II 
framework. For example, risk weights for claims on Mexican government bonds would have 
jumped from zero to 100 percent, imposing significantly higher borrowing costs for the 
Mexican economy. Other OECD member countries confronted with higher risk weights under 
Basel II would have been the Czech Republic, Hungary, South Korea, Poland and Turkey. 
Conversely, under the proposed standardized approach to credit risk, high-rated non-OECD 
governments would have gained access to international capital markets on more favorable 
terms. For instance, Chile and Colombia would have benefited from lower capital adequacy 
risk weights with their sovereign credit ratings as of December 31, 2000 if Basel II would 
have been adopted. 
Calculations by DEUTSCHE  BANK (2001) indicate that the gap between investment-
grade borrowers, typically based in OECD member countries, and speculative-grade 
borrowers, normally from emerging market economies, will intensify even more under the 
standardized approach to credit risk. However, such an outcome would obviously be against 
undertakings of the international financial community to enlarge the number of emerging 
market economies benefiting from international capital markets. Overall, Basel II would not 
only increase the capital cost for speculative-grade borrowers, but it would also boost the 
volatility of commercial banks’ lending to emerging market economies. 
Another crucial issue is that the focus of the standardized approach to credit risk lies in 
borrowers’ default risk rather than commercial banks’ unexpected losses, which is particularly 
problematic in the case of emerging market economies. Default risk for emerging markets is 
more prone to financial contagion than unexpected loss since these countries are vulnerable to 
liquidity crises. For example, MONFORT AND MULDER (2000) emphasize that in the absence of 
a perfect international lender of last resort, a liquidity-related financial crisis could result in a 
vicious circle. As examined in Kräussl (2003c), an unexpected financial crisis in a major 
borrowing emerging market economy would imply the credit rating agency’s downgrade of 
that sovereign. This in turn could trigger market participant’s expectations of credit rating 
downgrades in other emerging market economies, as borrowers’ default risk in these financial 
markets increases, which would imply a raise in commercial banks’ capital requirements and 
the ultimately withdrawal of their funds. During such a period of financial contagion, there 
may be an increased discrepancy between commercial banks’ unexpected loss and the - 32 - 
borrower’s probability of default which makes the utilization of credit rating agencies’ risk 
assessments a less appropriate instrument for regulatory capital requirements. 
 
V Conclusion  and  Outlook 
Under the standardized approach of Basel II, credit ratings are supposed to become 
fundamental determinants of the risk weights attached to bank exposures to governments and 
other borrowers. However, the empirical evidence casts doubt on the usefulness of credit 
ratings in determining commercial banks’ capital adequacy requirements. The findings of a 
first attempt to assess the potential implications of Basel II on the volatility and size of foreign 
lending to emerging market countries suggest that the standardized approach to credit risk 
would lead to more divergence rather than convergence between investment-grade and 
speculative-grade borrowers. This conclusion is based on the lateness and cyclical 
determination of credit rating agencies’ sovereign risk assessments and the continuing 
incentives for short-term rather than long-term interbank lending. 
The experience during the financial crises in emerging markets in the latter half of the 
1990s indicates that sovereign ratings can swiftly turn downward. The observed findings 
suggest that positive sovereign credit rating actions occur following financial market 
improvements while negative credit rating actions on the countries’ creditworthiness take 
place after financial market downturns. Relying on external credit risk assessments to 
determine regulatory capital requirements could create a substantial liquidity squeeze in the 
course of financial market turbulences. A credit rating agency’s sovereign downgrading 
would force commercial banks to immediately broaden their capital reserves against 
exposures to the lowered government, at a point when financial institutions should be 
supported to maintain credit lines open to avoid accelerating financial market crises. 
Therefore, the exclusive reliance on agencies’ sovereign risk assessments might introduce 
systemic risk and result in an enhanced rather than reduced degree of instability in the global 
financial market system. However, this is precisely contrary to what an optimal approach for 
commercial banks’ regulatory capital requirements should be. 
Nonetheless, the consensus among financial market regulators appears to be that 
although credit ratings have performed worse than their aim, they are still a second-best 
solution for enhancing the current Basel I capital adequacy requirements. However, the 
findings of this empirical study recommend that if Basel II were adopted, the standardized - 33 - 
approach to credit risk should be seen as an interim measure only, put in place while the 
banking and regulatory communities develop and fine-tune the IRB approach for determining 
commercial banks’ capital charges. 
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